![]() ![]() Through an overview of critical theory's engagement with American pragmatism in the works of Jürgen Habermas, Axel Honneth, and Rahel Jaeggi, I provide a theoretical framework explaining the theoretical underpinning of such a project. Whilst proximities between pragmatism and critical theory have been noted by several scholars, no attempt has been made so far to provide an all-encompassing philosophical interpretation of critical theory's appraisal of pragmatist themes. Organizing committee (NPN): Henrik Rydenfelt (Oulu), chair Mats Bergman (Helsinki) Antje Gimmler (Aalborg) Katariina Holma (Oulu) Erkki Kilpinen (Helsinki) Jonathan Knowles (NTNU, Trondheim) Torjus Midtgarden (Bergen) Jón Ólafsson (Reykjavík) Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen (Tallinn) Sami Pihlström (Helsinki) Bjørn Ramberg (Oslo) Frederik Stjernfelt (Aalborg/Copenhagen) Ulf Zackariasson (Uppsala) Chiara Ambrosio (UCL) Programme committee (EPA) Henrik Rydenfelt (Oulu NPN) Sami Pihlström (Helsinki NPN) Rossella Fabbrichesi (Università degli Studi di Milano Pragma) Guido Baggio (Roma 3 Pragma) Daniel Cefaï (EHESS Pragmata) Mathias Girel (ENS Pragmata) Emil Visnovsky (Comenius University CEPF) John Ryder (American University of Malta CEPF) Previous conferences The First European Pragmatism Conference (Rome, Italy, September 2012) The Second European Pragmatism Conference (Paris, France, September 2015) CONTACT The conference is hosted and sponsored by the University of Helsinki, the Academy of Finland Centre of Excellence Reason and Religious Recognition at the Faculty of Theology, and the Finnish Cultural Foundation. The conference is organized by the Nordic Pragmatism Network in collaboration with Associazione Pragma (Italy), Pragmata (France), the Central European Pragmatist Forum and the European Pragmatism Association. ![]() The third European Pragmatism Conference will take place at the University of Helsinki, Finland, in 13-15 June 2018. The goals of this essay are to clarify the objection, highlight the stakes in the debate, identify misunderstandings of Dewey’s experiential metaphysics on both sides, and determine why the experiential givenism objection merits serious philosophical scrutiny in the future. Gregory Pappas and David Hildebrand respond to Koopman’s version of the objection. The objection assumes a slightly different form in the hands of another scholar of American pragmatism, Colin Koopman. The upshot of Aikin’s objection is that these experiential givens constitute a proxy epistemological foundation for the beliefs that flow from inquiry-a position clearly in conflict with Dewey’s commitment to anti-foundationalism. While most philosophical pragmatists dedicate their attention to questions concerning how ideas improve experience (or the theory-practice continuum), those participating in this exchange have shown greater concern for an issue that is, at its core, a theoretical matter: Does the theory of experience espoused by the classic American philosopher John Dewey succumb to what contemporary analytic philosophers-for instance, Wilfred Sellars, Donald Davidson and John McDowell-call the Myth of the Given? One commentator, Scott Aikin, claims that Dewey relied on non-inferential and non-conceptual content or givens as perceptual inputs for cognitive experience. In the past four years, a small but intense debate has transpired on the margins of mainstream scholarship in the discipline of Philosophy, particularly within the sub-field of American pragmatism. ![]()
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